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Almost 25 years have passed since the fi rst institutional reforms in Latin 
America were implemented, following a wide trend toward the privatization 
of public utilities and other basic services. Part of this deep transformation 
entailed the adoption of regulatory forms of governance, that is, the role of 
an interventionist state was reduced in favor of a state whose intervention in 
the economy was done mostly through rules and regulation instead of taxing 
and spending.1 One common institutional feature of this transformation was 
the independent regulatory agency (IRA). The basic premise was that certain 
areas of the economy, such as public utilities, telecommunications, and bank-
ing, were be  er served if the regulator remained at arm’s length from politi-
cal pressures. The answer was to create law-based “agencies,” acting mostly 
through administrative means on the basis of a particular kind of expertise. 
The independence of these agencies would foster “credible commitments” on 
behalf of the state and limit regulatory opportunism.2 Moreover, in the con-
text of privatization, such independence would also provide much-needed 
assurance to foreign investors that their sunk costs would not be aff ected by 
administrative expropriation or manipulation.3 
Latin America was particularly fertile ground for the logic of “credible 
commitments.”4 During the 1990s, independent regulatory agencies prolifer-
ated in the region at a rate never before seen. Jacint Jordana and David Levi-
Faur report that only 43 regulatory authorities (mostly in the fi nancial sector) 
1  See Giandomenico Majone, From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of 
Changes in the Mode of Governance, 17(2) J. Pub. Policy 139–67 (1997).
2  See Fabrizio Gilardi, Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A 
Comparative Empirical Analysis, 9(6) J. European Pub. Policy 873–93 (2002).
3  See Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Com-
parative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, 10 J. L. Econ. & Org. 201 (1994).
4  See Vivien Foster, Ten Years of Water Service Reform in Latin America: Toward an Anglo-French 
Model (Intl. Bank Reconstruction & Dev.; World Bank 2005).
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existed in the region before 1979; by 2002 they had grown threefold to 138.5 
These numbers, though, do li  le to explain the impact that such proliferation 
has in the delivery of basic services in the region. Although the form of the IRA 
was widely adopted in Latin America (and elsewhere in the world), li  le is 
known about the actual operation of IRAs in their own contexts, and particu-
larly their role in boosting (or hindering) the delivery of the essential services 
that they regulate.6 
This gap seems to be particularly pressing in economies outside Europe 
and the United States, where the work of IRAs seemed to follow a diff erent tra-
jectory from that predicted by the “credible commitments” literature. This gap 
has been explored in recent literature through the lenses of the “Regulatory 
State in South.”7 From this perspective, certain shared contexts of countries 
in the “South” (e.g., the presence of powerful external pressures, especially 
from international fi nancial institutions, the greater intensity of redistributive 
politics in se  ings where infrastructure services are of extremely poor qual-
ity, and limited state capacity) are crucial to understanding regulatory gover-
nance in poorer economies— a reality that simply is lost in the perspective of 
regulatory transfer and diff usion. Understanding the impact of these shared 
contexts in the regulatory state is important for advancing regulatory theory 
and understanding the possibilities (and limits) of regulation in the delivery 
of essential services to the poorest. 
One key insight on the Regulatory State in the South project, which was 
led by Navroz K. Dubash and Bronwen Morgan and consisted of case stud-
ies of regulatory governance in countries outside the North Atlantic, was that 
courts are central actors in regulatory governance in developing countries. 
Traditional literature on the regulatory state situates the judiciary as protect-
ing contract and property rights, thus limiting state action and curbing dis-
cretion.8 In sharp contrast to this view, the experiences of the water sector 
in Colombia and Indonesia, and of telecommunications in India, show that 
the judiciary is a privileged site of regulatory governance where international 
pressures, distributive politics, and limited state capacity operate.9 
5  See Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, The Diff usion of Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America: 
Sectoral and National Channels in the Making of a New Order, 598(1) Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & 
Soc. Sci. 102–24 (2005).
6  Id. See also Jacint Jordana, David Levi-Faur, & Xavier Fernández i Marín, The Global Diff u-
sion of Regulatory Agencies Channels of Transfer and Stages of Diff usion, 44(10) Comp. Pol. Stud. 
1343–69 (2011); David Levi-Faur, The Global Diff usion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598(1) Annals 
Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 12–32 (2005).
7  See Navroz K. Dubash & Bronwen Morgan, Understanding the Rise of the Regulatory State of the 
South, 6(3) Regulation & Governance 261–81 (2012). The Regulatory State in the South project 
explores the possibility of fi nding particular characteristics in regulatory governance as ap-
plied in the global South that are diff erent from the same type of governance in the North. 
8 Id.
9  On Colombia, see Rene Urueña, Expertise and Global Water Governance: How to Start Think-
ing about Power over Water Resources?, 9 Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 117–52 
(2012); on Indonesia, see Nai Rui Chng, Regulatory Mobilization and Service Delivery at the Edge 
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Much has been said about the importance of the judiciary to economic 
and social development, particularly in Latin America, where activist courts 
have engendered economic transformations.10 Courts are, indeed, a crucial 
site of distributive politics in the region. However, current eff orts have been 
either focused on the justiciability and enforcement of social and economic 
rights or taken place in the context of rule of law programs concerned with 
reducing court backlogs, enhancing judicial training programs, and elimi-
nating judicial corruption. The Regulatory State in the South project brought 
forth a diff erent perspective on this nexus: in these countries, courts became 
deeply immersed in formulating regulatory regimes or reforming regulatory 
agencies; they became crucial players in the delivery of essential services, both 
as actors in their own right and as an institutional forum in which other actors 
could interact. 
This chapter further investigates the implications of this insight for the 
delivery of essential services in the region. Why do courts get involved in the 
regulatory process in Latin America? How is this involvement undertaken? 
What are the eff ects of courts’ involvement in the regulatory process in Latin 
America in terms of accountability and participation? Who wins and who 
loses when courts intervene? To explore these questions, the chapter builds 
on research done by a group of early-career scholars on the ground in Brazil, 
Colombia, and Argentina who came together as questions on the role of the 
judiciary in regulatory politics became part of a wider project on interinstitu-
tional interactions led by the Universidad de Los Andes (Colombia), with the 
support of the International Development Research Center. 
The research on which this chapter is based focuses on health care, the 
environment, and public utilities. Carolina Moreno explored the intervention 
of the Colombian Constitutional Court in the regulation of waste disposal in 
Bogota and its impact on the human rights of informal waste pickers. Flor-
encia Lebensohn investigated the role of environmental expertise and regu-
lation by the judiciary, focusing on the Matanza-Riachuelo River basin case 
in Argentina. Maria Prada and Santiago Rojas researched the impact of the 
judiciary in the provision of health services in Colombia. One further set of 
case studies focusing on Brazil will be published in a separate volume edited 
by Mariana Mota Prado, of the University of Toronto. This la  er set of cases is 
not discussed in this chapter. 
While each of these case studies will be published soon, the goal of this 
chapter is to present some of the overall lessons that can be distilled in terms of 
voice and accountability in the delivery of essential services in the region. The 
overall point is that the interaction between institutions ma  ers for improving 
of the Regulatory State, 6(3) Regulation & Governance 344–61 (2012); on India, see Arun K. 
Thiruvengadam & Piyush Joshi, Judiciaries as Crucial Actors in Southern Regulatory Systems: A 
Case Study of Indian Telecom Regulation, 6(3) Regulation & Governance 327–43 (2012).
10  See Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo & Theunis Roux, Courts and Social Transformation in 
New Democracies: An Institutional Voice for the Poor? (Ashgate 2006); David Landau, Political 
Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law, 51 Harv. Intl. L. J. 319 (2010).
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delivery of development in Latin America—and courts are a crucial player in 
such dynamics. The research focuses on three central ideas: fi rst, the notion of 
a “regulatory space” (both national and global), and its importance in improv-
ing delivery; second, the idea of institutional adaptation, and why deviating 
from “best practices” may not be such a bad thing after all; and, third, the 
importance of knowledge and experimentalist governance as a platform for 
fostering be  er governance. The fi nal section concludes the chapter. 
Interaction in a Regulatory Space: National and Global
Although the diff usion of IRAs is a well-established fact, their outcomes can-
not be understood by focusing on agencies as discrete units acting in isolation 
of other institutions. The challenges that regulation poses to the delivery of 
essential services can be be  er understood if the analytical unit is the space 
where interaction between institutions takes place. In this regulatory space, 
institutions are dynamic; they change and adapt to their interactions, defi ning 
the regulatory framework that impacts delivery of essential services.
A National Regulatory Space
A good way to begin thinking about this regulatory space is to highlight that 
IRAs do not enter a regulatory vacuum when they are implemented locally. 
A national ecosystem of institutions and actors is already in place when IRAs 
are adopted (as they were, for example, in Latin America during the 1990s), 
and there is some sort of regulation that needs to be adopted, transformed, 
or replaced through the work of the IRAs. These agencies enter as actors in 
a space where regulation is already being adopted, discussed, implemented, 
and rejected. As time passes, some IRAs become the main player in the regula-
tory fi eld, as seen in some of the countries examined herein. However, these 
dominant agencies do not completely crowd out the regulatory space; on the 
contrary, this space includes both the IRAs and other relevant actors, with 
whom IRAs interact.
The notion of a regulatory space was suggested as a reaction to the nar-
row reading of the regulatory process in terms of a confl ict between public 
authority and private interests. Against this view, the regulatory process can 
be be  er understood as a “space,” where it becomes possible to explore the 
“complex and shifting relationships between and within organizations at the 
heart of economic regulation.”11 The key is “to understand the nature of this 
shared space: the rules of admission, the relations between occupants, and the 
variations introduced by diff erences in markets and issue arenas.”12 
The image of a regulatory space aptly captures some of the dynamic inter-
actions between IRAs and courts we observed in our research. Most of the 
11  Leigh Hancher & Michael Moran, Organizing Regulatory Space in Capitalism, Culture, and Eco-
nomic Regulation, 271 (Leigh Hancher & Michael Moran ed., Clarendon Press 1989).
12 Id.
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regulatory outcomes we encountered (particularly pertaining to waste man-
agement and health regulation in Colombia and environmental regulation in 
Argentina) were not the product of an isolated IRA making a decision but the 
result of a set of actors that interacted and, through their interaction, deter-
mined the outcome. Understanding the impact of regulation in the delivery of 
development requires a focus not on IRAs alone but on the regulatory space 
they inhabit.
The notion of a space is useful to think about the way in which regula-
tory governance is undertaken and experienced in the cases we researched in 
Latin America. Delivery of essential services may be aff ected as IRAs compete 
with other actors or develop eff orts to coordinate with or even co-opt com-
peting agencies, a dynamic that has been observed in international relations, 
transnational business governance, environmental governance, and domestic 
regulation.13 
With the exception of Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran’s early insights, 
the interplay within regulatory spaces has been mostly overlooked by admin-
istrative law scholarship, which has focused on individual agencies and their 
procedures. Recently, some U.S. scholarship has explored interaction,14 focus-
ing on interagency interaction and coordination as a problem of overlapping 
legislative delegation.15 In this line of scholarship, courts are outside the shared 
regulatory space and act through judicial review in order to hinder or foster 
cooperation.16 Our approach is diff erent; it considers courts not as external to 
the regulatory space but as actors within it, with the same standing as IRAs. 
This, of course, has implications for judicial review, which are explored in the 
last section of the chapter.
 The Matanza-Riachuelo River basin case, researched by Florencia Delia 
Lebensohn in Argentina, provides a glimpse of the way in which interactions 
in the regulatory space may hinder the delivery of a healthy environment in 
Latin America. The Matanza-Riachuelo River basin is home to Argentina’s 
largest concentrations of urban poor, housing almost eight million people who 
live mostly in shantytowns that lack basic infrastructure. The basin is horri-
bly polluted; consequently, diarrhea, breathing problems, skin diseases, and 
13  On international relations, see Kenneth W. Abbo  , Jessica F. Green, & Robert O. Keohane, 
Organizational Ecology and Organizational Strategies in World Politics, 13–57 (Harv. Kennedy 
Sch. Govt. Discussion Papers 2013); on transnational business governance, see Burkard 
Eberlein et al., Transnational Business Governance Interactions: Conceptualization and Framework 
for Analysis, 8(1) Regulation & Governance 1–21 (2014); on environmental governance, see 
Sebastian Oberthür & Thomas Gehring, Institutional Interaction: Ten Years of Scholarly Develop-
ment in Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change 
25–58 (Sebastian Oberthür & Olav Schram Stokke eds., MIT Press 2011).
14  See Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111(4) Colum. L. Rev. 745–94 (2011); Jody 
Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1131 
(2011).
15  See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 1 S. Ct. 
Rev. 201–47 (2006).
16 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 14.
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other health problems are common. Cleanup eff orts have been undertaken 
since the 1960s to no avail, a situation that has been traditionally chalked up 
to a failure of governance and incoherent regulation. More than 50 sets of 
rules apply to the river basin, which is under the concurrent jurisdiction of the 
federal government, the government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, 
the government of the Province of Buenos Aires, and the governments of 14 
municipalities. The Inter-American Development Bank approved a US$250 
million loan in the late 1990s that was never used because governance prob-
lems proved to be an insurmountable obstacle.17 
Lebensohn reports that, in 2004, a group of neighbors fi led a claim for 
damages based on conditions in the basin. The Supreme Court of Argentina 
adopted two wide-ranging decisions (in 2006 and 2008), which led to an inte-
grated cleanup plan for the basin. The plan can be seen as an eff ort by the 
court to organize a regulatory space left in chaos by the historical failure of 
traditional agencies. It gave specifi c directions for the coordination of most 
of the concerned agencies, culminating in the creation of a new agency, the 
Autoridad de la Cuenca Matanza-Riachuelo (ACUMAR), something akin to a 
regulatory joint venture, with the participation of the federal government and 
the provincial and city governments of Buenos Aires. 
ACUMAR was structured like an IRA and became the crucial player for 
implementing the cleanup eff ort. However, its role cannot be understood in 
isolation of the court’s intervention, either before or after its establishment in 
2006. ACUMAR is constantly in touch with the Supreme Court, which played 
a big role in its creation and whose stature boosts its legitimacy, and with the 
federal court, which oversees the implementation of the cleanup eff orts and 
provides a forum for the enforcement of those eff orts, imposing fi nes in cases 
of noncompliance.
This interaction opened new spaces for participation and accountability 
in Argentina’s environmental regulatory process. The Supreme Court itself 
allowed for participation in its public sessions as it discussed the cleanup plan 
(thereby defi ning a procedure that has since been used in ma  ers beyond this 
case). Moreover, the court also ordered the ombudsman to set up a commis-
sion, the Comision de Participacion Social, to receive suggestions in relation 
to the cleanup plan. This body is composed of local nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), which distribute updated information and have standing 
to fi le administrative challenges before ACUMAR in ma  ers related to the 
plan. As discussed later, a similar pa  ern was found in the Colombian case 
of health care, where the Constitutional Court held public hearings, which 
were widely a  ended, and required other institutions involved to provide for 
17  See Decree No. 145/98, by which the Executive Branch approved a model contract to be en-
tered into between the National Bank of Argentina and the Inter-American Development 
Bank to receive the US$250 million loan to clean the Matanza-Riachuelo River basin. The 
contract was signed on Feb. 5, 1998, between the Argentine state and the Inter-American 
Development Bank. See Florencia Delia Lebensohn, Regulatory Role of the Supreme Court of 
Argentina: The Matanza-Riachuelo River Basin Case (on fi le with author).
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spaces of participation and notice-and-comment procedures in their regula-
tory processes. 
The Matanza-Riachuelo River basin case evidences the existence of a reg-
ulatory space where IRAs act and a possible role that courts could play in 
facilitating essential services. In Argentina, the regulatory space was densely 
populated by numerous institutions with overlapping mandates, which 
proved to be an obstacle for eff ectively solving the pollution problem. The 
Supreme Court thus entered to organize the regulatory space and, by doing 
so, it opened spaces of participation and accountability. The court, though, 
triggered the creation of a new agency. That is one more actor in the regula-
tory space that has to interact with existing agencies, which in turn will adapt 
their strategies, forcing ACUMAR to adapt its own. Interactions in the regula-
tory space are in this sense decidedly nonlinear: the shape of the regulatory 
space changes as interactions occur and creates loops that infl uence the actors, 
their behavior, and cognitive frameworks. 
A Global Regulatory Space 
The regulatory space that IRAs inhabit is mostly circumscribed by national 
borders; IRAs interact mostly with other national institutions, and their 
impacts are felt within nation-states. That was the case in Colombia, where 
domestic IRAs interacted with domestic courts in order to solve social prob-
lems, thus aff ecting the regulatory process. But some interactions may also 
involve international institutions, such as international development banks 
or international courts. These interactions are part of an emergent “global 
administrative space,” which has been defi ned as “a space, distinct from the 
space of inter-state relations governed by international law and the domestic 
regulatory space governed by domestic administrative law, although encom-
passing elements of each.”18 
Some aspects of regulatory governance in Latin America have been situ-
ated in the global regulatory space, particularly in connection with investment 
arbitration and the human rights to water.19 Our research confi rms the impor-
tance of this space beyond the nation-state. 
In the Matanza-Riachuelo River basin, the Supreme Court expressly 
tied the monitoring of ACUMAR’s performance to the use of international 
18  See Benedict Kingsbury, Richard B. Stewart, & Niko Krisch, The Emergence of Global Adminis-
trative Law, 68 L. & Contemporary Problems 15–61 (2005).
19  On investment arbitration, see Andréa Rocha Postiga, A emergência do Direito Administrativo 
Global como ferramenta de regulação transnacional do investimento estrangeiro direito, 10(1) Revis-
ta de Direito Internacional (2013), doi:10.5102/rdi.v10i1.2369; Nicolás M. Perrone, Los tratados 
bilaterales de inversión y el arbitraje internacional: ¿En dirección al mejor funcionamiento de las 
instituciones domésticas? 17 Revista de Derecho 63–88 (2012); Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan 
Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality, and 
the Emerging Global Administrative Law (N.Y.U. Pub. L. & Leg. Theory Working Papers, Sept. 
2009), h  p://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/146. On water rights, see Rene Urueña, The Rise of the 
Constitutional Regulatory State in Colombia: The Case of Water Governance, 6(3) Regulation & 
Governance 282–99 (2012).
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indicators, which fostered the adoption of quantitative instruments developed 
by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), 
which became crucial to ACUMAR’s task. More important, though, was the 
role of the World Bank. Lebensohn writes that, soon after the 2008 decision, 
Argentina secured from the World Bank one of the largest loans to a Latin 
American country for environmental purposes: US$1 billion. The grant was 
directly geared to boosting the cleanup eff ort by ACUMAR and others. The 
role of the World Bank in shaping interactions in the emerging global regula-
tory space cannot be understated. One part of the story is, obviously, fi nancial 
clout: the Bank is in a privileged position to steer resources to particular play-
ers, thus boosting one actor and not the other. In this case, the Bank supported 
the Supreme Court’s role in organizing the Argentinean regulatory space and 
put its funds behind ACUMAR. 
Perhaps as important as its fi nancial muscle is the Bank’s epistemic clout: 
its intervention lends expert authority to some of the players in the regulatory 
space. In this case, the Bank’s expertise lent its aura of technocratic expertise 
to ACUMAR, which badly needed it in order to become an important player 
in an already populated regulatory space. Most crucially, the Bank helped 
defi ne the “problem” to be tackled: the overall shape of the regulatory space, 
both domestic and global. The Bank’s role here was to underscore that the 
problem was one of governance (and not of, say, availability of technology or of 
technical capacity), hence the strategy was to boost the institutional capacity 
of ACUMAR. This exercise of epistemic framing was important in the process 
of improving delivery of essential services in that it created the conceptual 
infrastructure that will guide the decision-making process in the future. 
Policy Transfers, “Best Practices,” and Deviations 
IRAs are not merely “transplanted” or their policies “transferred” from their 
original site (usually the Anglo-Saxon world) into a new environment (in this 
case, Latin America). The trajectory of independent regulatory agencies exam-
ined suggests that institutions that are “transplanted” are then transformed 
by contextual interactions, creating doubt as to whether, over time, the very 
idea of “transfer” is still useful. 
The Matanza-Riachuelo River basin case is a clear example of this dynamic. 
ACUMAR was created with the sole purpose of regulating and managing 
the cleanup project, but it had an unclear policy goal (beyond, of course, the 
general objective of cleaning up the basin). Its ideological and technical bent 
remained unclear as it started operating: was it a strong proenvironment 
agency that would use its legitimacy to prioritize the cleanup eff ort over all 
other (economic) interests? Or was it an agency more akin to a public utilities 
regulator, concerned with economic effi  ciency and cost recovery? 
As it turned out, ACUMAR was neither. Its emphasis changed as it 
interacted with other actors in the regulatory space—from focusing on the 
environment, to considering costs, and then back to the environment. This 
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fi nding diff ers from the idea of policy transfer, which implies that the “policy” 
remains for the most part unchanged as it is transferred.20 To be sure, the idea 
of “transfer” does acknowledge that the policy must “take root” and deal with 
its context, but it frames this as a problem of eff ectiveness; the policy’s internal 
rationale remains untouched. The same can be said of literature on transplants 
and “legal origins,” and the prescriptive agenda a  ached thereto,21 which has 
had some infl uence on thinking within multilateral institutions working in the 
development fi eld.22 The concept of transplant assumes that law is an instru-
ment that can be used to solve certain kinds of problems in varying contexts. 
Again, the most sophisticated versions of this literature acknowledge that the 
eff ectiveness of these transplants may require that the context be considered, 
but the instrument itself is not transformed as it is used. The focus remains 
on the IRA as an isolated and static actor that adopts regulation based on its 
expertise and that is required to consider the impact of its regulation on the 
wider context but remains oblivious of the eff ects of the wider context on itself.
In contrast, our research suggests that the internal rationale of some IRAs 
does change as their policies are implemented over the years, and courts have 
an important role in this process. The case of waste management in Bogotá, 
researched by Carolina Moreno, provides an example. Colombia is a standard 
case of expertise-based regulation for public utilities, adopted by IRAs estab-
lished in the 1990s. In the case of Bogotá, waste management was arranged, 
also in the 1990s, through the concession of exclusive service areas to private 
providers. The creation of these exclusive areas required the approval of the 
national IRA; once approved, the municipality’s independent agency signed 
the concession contracts with private providers and set the tariff  structure 
through the contract. In doing this, both the national IRA and the municipal-
ity’s agency followed an effi  ciency-based rationale, in which the main consid-
erations were cost recovery and universal coverage.
As Moreno reports, this regulatory framework overlapped with the 
human rights of informal waste pickers (recicladores), who traditionally have 
earned a living by going through the city’s garbage containers. The tariff  
structure failed to recognize a cost associated with their work. Moreover, it 
established a duty on consumers: to dispose of waste using private conces-
sionaries (mainly through closed garbage containers, which could be picked 
up by trucks), thus pu  ing waste pickers out of business. This confl ict ended 
up before the Constitutional Court, which ordered that the tariff  structure 
both take into consideration the human rights of waste pickers and, eventu-
ally, strike down the whole bidding process—not because of disputes related 
20  David P. Dolowi   & David Marsh, Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contem-
porary Policy-Making, 13(1) Governance 5–23 (2000).
21  Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of 
Legal Origins, 46(2) J. Econ. Lit. 285–332 (2008).
22  Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, 
in The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal 253–300 (David M. Trubek & 
Alvaro Santos ed., Cambridge U. Press 2006).
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to the contract but because the tariff  structure underlying the bidding process 
failed to consider the human rights of informal waste pickers.23
The trajectory of the regulatory agency in this case suff ered important 
changes. As it interacted with the Constitutional Court for almost a decade, 
both the national and the municipal IRAs struggled to include the language 
of human rights in their decision making. The Constitutional Court spoke in 
deontological terms, requiring the regulator to consider the right to work of 
waste pickers and, even more complex, their right to a “vital minimum,” that 
is, a constitutional construct that imposes on the state the duty to provide for 
the minimum material needs of its citizens so as to guarantee their dignity. 
The regulatory agencies, in contrast, had a fairly functionalist view of rights 
and the law; their role was to create a predictable and stable environment for 
the investor and to respect property and contractual rights. 
The clash of rationalities was imminent, but it did not lead to paralysis. 
The independent agencies shifted their discourse and developed a diff erent 
kind of regulation but still maintained the overall structure of privatization 
and concessions. Interestingly, even after the recent political upheaval in 
Bogotá concerning waste management, when a left-wing mayor tried to termi-
nate the concession contracts, the basic tariff  structure remained in place. The 
deep grammar of regulation that resulted from the interaction between the 
IRAs and the Constitutional Court, which mixed elements of both standard 
effi  ciency-seeking regulatory practice and human rights, became the new reg-
ulatory common sense in the country.
The fact that an institution (in this case, IRAs) needs to adapt to its context 
seems intuitive enough. However, the dynamics of change and adaptation 
seem foreign to the traditional reading of IRAs and their role in the delivery 
of essential services, as they continue to be portrayed as static actors with 
univocal rationality that “travels” across the world. Part of the problem is the 
idea of deviation from what are termed “best practices.” As seen earlier, the 
logic underlying IRAs is one of credible commitments, which in turn requires 
a certain level of independence from political pressures. 
Interactions of the kind described here can be read as a deviation from 
these best practices. The fact that a Constitutional Court intervenes in the reg-
ulatory process can be read not as an exercise in adaptation but as a deviation 
from the required independence that makes for good regulation. There is a 
specifi c meaning a  ached to a “good” regulatory system, which can be easily 
consulted in the World Bank’s Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory 
Systems.24 If a regulatory framework deviates from this standard, it is “wrong” 
and needs to be “fi xed.”
23  Corte Constitucional Colombia, Sentencia T-724, M.P. Jaime Araujo Renteria (2003), h  p://corte
-constitucional.vlex.com.co/vid/-43620288;] Corte Constitucional Colombia; Auto 275, M.P. 
Juan Carlos Henao (2011), h  p://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2010/T-616-10.htm.
24  Ashley C. Brown, Jon Stern, & Bernard William Tenenbaum, Handbook for Evaluating Infra-
structure Regulatory Systems (World Bank 2006).
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This prescriptive mode is often problematic, because there is the possibil-
ity of normative disagreement with the model of the state that underlies regu-
latory good practices, as embodied in instruments such as the Handbook, that is, 
the idea of the state as an interest-driven actor that should remain in the back-
ground as regulator rather than play an active role as service provider.25 If such 
disagreement occurs, then best practices become impositions of multilateral 
institutions, which then trigger a political debate well known in Latin America. 
Interestingly, though, the Colombian case study suggests that, in the case 
of regulatory governance, the disagreement seldom occurs at that level of “hot” 
ideological politics. Perhaps due to the amazing expansion of IRAs in Latin 
America, both defenders of best practices and those who resist them assume 
that the rationale underlying IRAs remains unchanged as time passes. Their 
rationale is seen as a “fact,” which one embraces or rejects but never tries to 
change. However, our research suggests that this is not necessarily the case. 
Even the basic (and admi  edly debatable) understanding of the state changes as 
IRAs live out their lives in their national context. Sometimes it changes toward 
recognizing a more active role for the state, as was the case in the Colombian 
example, or it could change otherwise. As IRAs adapt to their environment, 
their inner rationale also adapts, and this transforms regulatory governance. 
The same could be observed in the Matanza-Riachuelo River basin case, 
where there is clear agreement on the overall goal of environmental improve-
ment. However, this goal triggered ever-changing regulatory strategies on 
behalf of ACUMAR, some of which refl ect diverging ideological commit-
ments, some more market-oriented than others. But this is hardly a case of 
mere deviation from best practices. It implies a complex process of interac-
tion and adaptation that may lead to diff erent courses of action to achieve the 
goal of an appropriate delivery of essential services, such as appropriate waste 
management or a clean environment. From this perspective, the experience 
of judiciary involvement in the cases researched in Colombia and Argentina 
suggests that there is a wide range of experimentation that is possible in regu-
latory governance, where institutions are players that repeatedly shape each 
other. Beyond the top-down approach of best practices, the trajectory of IRAs 
seems also to involve adaptation and learning from other institutions follow-
ing a diff erent rationale. This may suggest that a way to improve delivery of 
services is to go beyond best practices, and to gear the interaction and adapta-
tion that is already occurring to a more purposeful process of experimentation. 
Experimentalism, Expertise, and Interactions
Much of the dynamic described in the previous two sections can be thought of 
as instances of experimentalist governance, where an ultimate goal is set and 
autonomy is given to relatively independent agents to use diff erent means 
25  Megan Donaldson & Benedict Kingsbury, Ersa   Normativity or Public Law in Global Gover-
nance: The Hard Case of International Prescriptions for National Infrastructure Regulation, 14(1) 
Chi. J. Intl. L. 1–51 (2013).
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to achieve that goal, subject to constant review and deliberation.26 Confi rm-
ing the need to go beyond best practices, our research suggests that this is an 
important angle when thinking about regulatory governance in Latin Amer-
ica. However, it still seems unclear whether this is an actual emergence of 
experimentalist governance in the region. 
In this respect, the case of waste management in Bogotá stands in sharp 
contrast with the Matanza-Riachuelo River experience. Interaction between 
the Colombian judiciary and IRAs seems ill-suited for an experimentalist 
description; while the interaction indeed occurred and had impacts, it was 
not part of a purposive process of adaptation and experimentation toward an 
ultimate goal. Rather, it seemed to be an ad hoc process, with no clear ulti-
mate goal and no organized system of review and deliberation. In this sense, 
while the waste management case does evidence a process of IRA adaptation 
triggered by interaction with a court, this process was not crucially driven by 
iterative sharing of knowledge. Instead, the injection of deontological values 
(such as human rights) into the functional contractual framework of conces-
sions seems more an instance of bricolage, that is, the tinkering with the deep 
grammar of neoliberal regulatory governance to achieve new norms, without 
a notion of the causal pathways that would lead these new legal u  erances 
to achieve the overall policy goal of a be  er waste management.27 In contrast, 
the Argentinean case suggests a more structured process of experimentalist 
governance, where interaction in the regulatory space seems geared to bet-
ter knowledge, which would enhance ACUMAR’s eff ectiveness. The process 
implies the adoption of a broad goal (the cleanup), and of specifi c metrics (the 
UN’s ECLAC indicators), under which the performance of the “autonomous” 
entity (ACUMAR) would be monitored in consultation with relevant stake-
holders, who participated through the spaces opened by the ombudsman, fol-
lowing orders by the Supreme Court. 
 Even if the cases investigated provide uncertain evidence of an actual 
turn in Latin America toward experimentalist governance, such examples do 
underscore the importance of knowledge production and diff usion in regula-
tory governance in the region. Cognitive pathways develop, as knowledge 
fl ows between IRAs and other institutions that populate the regulatory space, 
transforming the way in which issues are framed and understood. To be sure, 
cognitive frameworks are important in general political processes,28 but they 
seem particularly relevant in the case of regulatory governance, where techni-
26  Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Diff erence: The New Architecture of Experi-
mentalist Governance in the EU, 14(3) European L. J. 271–327 (2008); Charles F. Sabel & Jona-
than Zeitlin, Experimentalist Governance, in The Oxford Handbook of Governance, 169–86 (David 
Levi-Faur ed., Oxford U. Press 2012).
27  Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, Nature of Human Society Series (Weidenfeld & Nicol-
son 1966).
28  Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview 
and Assessment, 26(1) Annual Rev. Sociology 611–39 (2000).
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cal expertise plays a key role in shaping the issues, suggesting causal relations, 
and providing legitimacy for IRAs and other actors in the regulatory space.
The important role of knowledge can be seen in the case study on Colom-
bian health care developed by Maria Prada and Santiago Rojas. In 2006, after 
several years of massive failure in the implementation of a new health care 
system by regulators, the Colombian Constitutional Court stepped in, adopt-
ing an ambitious decision aimed at solving some of the system’s structural 
problems. The problem, however, was that the court stepped into a regulatory 
space with a steep learning curve; health care is a very technical fi eld that had 
been dominated by economists since liberalization occurred in the early1990s. 
The complexities of the health care system were not lost to the court, which 
adopted a mammoth four-hundred-page decision that tried to fi nd strategic 
bo  lenecks in the system and gave specifi c orders to dozens of governmental 
institutions to fi x them. 
Foreseeing diffi  culties with the implementation of such a wide-ranging 
decision, the court implemented a complex monitoring procedure, where agen-
cies constantly had to report back to the court on their improvements. During 
this process, the court oscillated between judicial activism in the form of direct 
regulation (mainly in the 2006 decision) and a more restrained tone, adopted 
during the monitoring process, deferent to the expertise of more-established 
players in the regulatory space. The institutional form of this dynamic mirrors 
that of the Matanza-Riachuelo case, as the Colombia court tried here to estab-
lish a structure of agency autonomy and monitoring, closely resembling ideas 
of experimentalist governance. The court would thus rely on the expertise of 
other agencies in the regulatory space to fi nd the most appropriate means to 
achieve a given goal, but it still defi ned the goals to be achieved.
This structure required a reliable system of monitoring, which the court 
tried to develop by establishing the parameters for acceptable indicators, 
which would in turn be adopted by the regulatory agencies themselves, and 
then reported back to the court. Highlighting the global dimension of this pro-
cess, the standard that the court adopted for this purpose was not national but 
international: the basic framework of health indicators developed by the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights, which became part of the health care 
regulatory space where the Colombian court acted. As noted earlier, a similar 
pa  ern was observed in the Argentinean case, where the Supreme Court used 
international indicators (in that case, the UN’s ECLAC) to structure a credible 
system of monitoring. 
The role of knowledge and expertise in the process of monitoring is 
remarkable. In sharp contrast with its strong (“activist”) original decision, the 
follow-up process shows a court open to learn from the agencies it interacts 
with, a move that may point both to a more deferential a  itude toward the 
technical expertise of these agencies and to the relative lack of political power 
of the court. Moreover, this a  itude also applied to “experts” in civil society. 
The court held open hearings, where it invited NGOs to participate, but, more 
interestingly, it also created an Expert Commission: a standing commi  ee of 
The World Bank Legal Review358
about 30 people, chosen by the court, consisting mainly of NGO and private 
insurers’ representatives as well as some academics. The commission’s task was 
to enhance the court’s technical knowledge by discussing the challenges faced 
by the health care system in implementing the court’s structural injunctions 
and possible alternative means to comply. The commission met in Constitu-
tional Court building, with court law clerks se  ing the agenda and moderating 
the discussion among the experts. Afterward, a summary of the debate and the 
conclusions were sent to the justices in charge of the monitoring process.
An interesting development occurred during this process, triggered by 
the interaction of courts and regulatory agencies. Much of the legitimacy of 
IRAs is derived from their “expert” status, as opposed to the “political” oppor-
tunism of nonindependent institutions and of Congress. The court’s interven-
tion seems also to place the onus on the “technical” side of the equation, this 
time, though, based on a diff erent technical expertise: law. However, the court 
also creates mechanisms to draw from other technical knowledge and tries to 
include it in its own process of monitoring—not as a binding order, to be sure, 
but as a general framework of discussion. 
The goal of this “expert” consultation seems diff erent from public hear-
ings, which the court also held. The idea here seems less to provide voice 
to stakeholders than to tap into expertise that the court seems to lack. This 
layout points to a form of participation in regulatory governance that is dif-
ferent from notice-and-comment procedures and other similar participatory 
arrangements. 
It is hard to estimate the exact infl uence of this process in the fi nal out-
come. The court did not refer to this process in its further decisions, and the 
“Commission of Experts” was not convened again. The very existence of this 
process, however, underscores the importance of informal expert consensus in 
the delivery of essential services in Latin America. In much the same way that 
best practices are often the result of a technocratic consensus among experts 
who defi ne the vocabulary being deployed by IRAs in domestic se  ings, the 
interaction of such agencies with courts seems also infl uenced by the role of 
expert knowledge. 
The fl ow of such knowledge can be be  er understood in terms of the 
global regulatory space. It is developed in sites beyond a particular nation- 
state, such as the World Bank in the case of the Handbook for Evaluating Infra-
structure Regulatory Systems, or the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights in the case of health indicators, and is then deployed transnationally in 
diff erent domestic se  ings. Improving voice and accountability, especially in 
regard to this specifi c aspect of the global regulatory space and its impact on 
the delivery of essential services, remains challenging despite its importance.29 
Recent scholarship has tried to frame similar exercises of power through 
information as expressions of “international public authority,” thus subject 
29  Megan Donaldson & Benedict Kingsbury, Ersa   Normativity or Public Law in Global Gover-
nance: The Hard Case of International Prescriptions for National Infrastructure Regulation, 14(1) 
Chi. J. Intl. L. 1–51 (2013).
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to requirements of public law or of global administrative law.30 Opening new 
spaces of participation in the regulatory process risks expanding the infl uence 
of experts, whose opinions could outweigh the opinion of nonexperts; in the 
Colombian case, the “Commission of Experts” seemed to have more direct 
access to the decision-making process. Moreover, the question of accountabil-
ity also poses challenges: should scholars think of expertise as a source of 
authority in the global regulatory space? How can they start thinking about 
accountability in that context?31 
Conclusion: Courts and Agencies as Institutions, 
Actors, and Spaces of Deliberation 
Our research posits a regulatory space where diff erent institutions interact. 
This interaction occurs at three diff erent levels. 
On a fi rst level, private parties (e.g., consumers and service providers) are 
actors that are regulated by these institutions; they have exogenous prefer-
ences, and courts and IRAs are constraints to their interactions; they are “insti-
tutions” in the sense that they embody and enact rules of the game that private 
actors must follow.32 This is the standard view of regulation and was observed 
in our research. For instance, in the waste disposal case, the central point was 
to create regulatory incentives so that informal waste pickers could continue 
doing their job. The IRA fi rst had to adopt some command-and-control regu-
lation in order to lead private suppliers to open a space for this to happen; it 
then had to force the discussion on certain contractual clauses to achieve this 
goal. 
At this level, interinstitutional interaction presents certain kinds of chal-
lenges and opportunities for both private actors and institutions. For private 
actors, institutional interplay opens a wide range of possible strategic behav-
iors by adopting cross-institutional political strategies. Forum shopping is a 
possibility, as was the case in Bogotá, where waste pickers went to the Con-
stitutional Court to get what the IRA was denying. Private parties may also 
engage in fostering the creation of a new institution (such as ACUMAR, in 
Argentina) to trigger interaction with existing institutions that may benefi t 
the private actor. Moreover, private actors may seek to trigger internal insti-
30  On public law, see Armin von Bogdandy & Ma  hias Goldmann, Taming and Framing Indi-
cators: A Legal Reconstruction of the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) in Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Quantifi cation and Rankings, 52–85 
(Benedict Kingsbury ed., Oxford U. Pr. 2012); on global administrative law, see Sabino 
Cassese & Lorenzo Casini. 2012. Public Regulation of Global Indicators in Governance by Indica-
tors: Global Power through Quantifi cation and Rankings 465–74 (Benedict Kingsbury et al. ed., 
Oxford U. Press).
31  See Rene Urueña, The Rise of the Constitutional Regulatory State in Colombia: The Case of Water 
Governance, 6(3) Regulation & Governance 282–99 (2010); David Kennedy, Challenging Expert 
Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 Sydney L. Rev. 5 (2005).
32  Douglass C. North, Institutions Ma  er, Econ. History (1994), h  p://128.118.178.162/eps/eh
/papers/9411/9411004.pdf. 
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tutional change by using interaction, as when Colombian health care patients 
used litigation in order to change internal procedures of health regulatory 
agencies. Finally, though we did not observe this, it is possible to expect that 
private actors may also seek to create strategic inconsistency, by seeking inter-
action between institutions that lead to inconsistent results. 
For institutions, the main challenge at this level is eff ectiveness. Interinsti-
tutional interplay may hinder the eff ectiveness of regulation directed toward 
private actors. In the waste management example, the IRA adopted a set of 
rules whose impact was undermined by the intervention of a court. However, 
interaction could also bolster eff ectiveness, by lending legitimacy to a weak 
institution (as was the case of health care in Colombia) or by providing an 
enforcement mechanism that the IRA lacked, as the example of ACUMAR in 
Argentina shows. 
 At a second level, institutions themselves are actors. As such, their inter-
actions can be driven by strategic behavior as well: institutions can compete 
with each other, cooperate, or end up co-opting or dominating other institu-
tions in the regulatory space. Our research suggests at least two ways to think 
about this scenario. First, IRAs behave as actors, and courts set the rules for 
their interaction. That was the case in Argentina, where several institutions 
with overlapping mandates behaved strategically and failed to solve an envi-
ronmental challenge. The Supreme Court consequently stepped in to develop 
rules of coordination. Second, a court can also be one of the actors behaving 
strategically: the Colombian Constitutional Court competed with other agen-
cies in the health care case, successfully leading many of them in following its 
regulatory scheme. 
This la  er situation brings up the question of the role of judicial review 
in the global regulatory space. As seen earlier, most literature in regulatory 
governance situates courts either as enforcers of property and contract rights 
or as a limit to the power of independent agencies. The case studies examined 
in this chapter suggest a diff erent landscape. Courts seem not to be external to 
the regulatory space; rather, they appear to be actors within it. They develop 
specifi c regulations, compete with other regulatory agencies, and seem to 
be in need of legitimacy. This need for legitimacy may have implications on 
the institutional design of judicial review in Latin America, which has been 
traditionally expansive. Possible normative outcomes could include creating 
constitutional frameworks that restrain courts in their new regulatory role, 
or the exact opposite: embracing the role of courts as actors in the regulatory 
space, and developing constitutional frameworks that set the conditions for a 
wholly new form of regulation resulting from the interaction between courts 
and independent agencies. How would regulatory reform and judicial review 
be transformed if the rule (and not the exception) was active involvement of 
the judiciary in regulation?
At this second level, where institutions behave as actors, interaction also 
triggers interesting processes of learning and adaptation. The rationale of 
IRAs does not remain unchanged, as the waste management case showed. 
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Interaction can be structured in such a way as to take advantage of this learn-
ing process: some of the eff orts discussed in this chapter (in Argentina, for 
instance, and in the health care case in Colombia) seem close to experimentalist 
views of governance. Such possible infl uence of experimentalist governance 
is in stark contrast when the focus is on best practices, but it may suggest an 
interesting range of possibilities to enhance delivery of essential services to 
the poorest. Instead of focusing on IRAs as stand-alone units and on the ways 
that things should be done, scholars could think in terms of interaction and 
how it triggers learning and experimentation. One way to make this approach 
operational is to think about institutional design that opens spaces for interac-
tional learning. Some of the examples explored here, though, seem to do that 
on an ad hoc basis, without purposefully highlighting the learning aspect of 
the regulatory interaction. 
From this perspective, multilateral fi nancial institutions may have an 
important contribution to make. As seen, much of adapting and learning is 
based on knowledge. In fact, the very defi nition of the problems that need to 
be solved is infl uenced by issues of framing and cognitive path dependencies. 
While funds for institutional functioning are crucial (e.g., the World Bank’s 
involvement with ACUMAR), much of the regulatory heavy lifting is done 
under the form of informal expert networks, often infl uenced by state-of-
the-art knowledge produced by multilateral institutions. This is an angle of 
the delivery of essential services that seems important to explore, both in its 
promises and in its challenges of accountability and participation.
At the third level, regulatory regimes may also interact. Although this idea 
may seem peculiar from the perspective of law and development scholarship, 
it has proved fruitful in international law and international relations.33 Global 
regimes, featuring a specialized set of norms, a distinct institutional archi-
tecture (including courts), a distinct epistemic community, and a particular 
rationale, can be seen as independent enough to “collide” with other special-
ized global regimes.34 We observed some hints of this possibility. The waste 
management experience can be seen as part of Colombian institutional poli-
tics, but also as a Colombian expression of a more global interaction between 
international human rights and the rules of investment protection. While 
this approach is less conducive to specifi c proposals of domestic institutional 
reform, it would seem that improving delivery of essential services to the poor 
requires that scholars, activists, and development experts widen their angle to 
think also of delivery in terms of global governance. 
33  See Mar  i Koskenniemi, Hegemonic Regimes, in Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing 
Fragmentation, 305–23 (Margaret Young ed., Cambridge U. Press 2012); Gunther Teubner & 
Peter Korth, Two Kinds of Legal Pluralism: Collision of Transnational in the Double Fragmentation 
of the World Society, in Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (Margaret 
Young ed., Cambridge U. Press 2012); Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime 
Complex for Climate Change, 9(1) Perspectives Pol. 7–23 (2011).
34  Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, Mich. J. Intl. L. 999 (2004).

